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U.S.C. § 922(G)(4): THE SIXTH CIRCUIT PROVIDES
A PATH FORWARD
BENNETT E. KUHAR*
ABSTRACT
Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) imposes a disability prohibiting the ownership and
possession of firearms on individuals who have been previously involuntarily
committed. Because of an inconsistent patchwork of state and federal laws, relief from
this disability, or restoration of an individual’s fundamental right to own or possess
firearms, is not available to all people. In effect, some individuals who have been
previously involuntarily committed face a lifetime ban, while other similarly situated
people can own or possess firearms once again. This issue has created a circuit split
between the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. Despite applying the same constitutional
analysis to the issue and similar facts, all three circuits reached different results. The
Sixth Circuit found an individual who had been previously involuntarily committed
many years prior had a Second Amendment claim to challenge the firearm disability
prohibiting firearm ownership. This Note asserts the Sixth Circuit’s analysis is most
persuasive because it properly applies intermediate scrutiny, it is consistent with the
current understanding of Second Amendment rights and related legislative history, it
fairly considers the rights of those with a history of mental illness rather than continues
the stigmatization of mental illness, and it effectively balances the rights of those
previously involuntarily committed with the compelling government interests of
general public safety.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Looking to protect his home and his family, Joe Smith1 made the decision to
purchase his first firearm. While the process of purchasing a first firearm can be
intimidating, Joe went to the local sportsmen store, and the clerk walked him through
the process with relative ease. He selected the firearm he wanted to purchase and
began the process of completing his background check by filling out the required selfreporting questionnaire. Joe waited while the clerk ran his background check through
the federal system. After a short while, the clerk returned to him and informed Joe he
could not complete the sale. Joe’s background check indicated that he had a
“disability” 2 that prohibited him from purchasing or possessing a firearm. Twenty
years prior, when Joe was a young adult, he had been involuntarily committed to a
psychiatric institution. Since then, Joe has had a clean bill of health, graduated from
college, earned a graduate degree, has been promoted numerous times in his job, and
has started a family. By all means, Joe is an upstanding and productive member of

1 Joe Smith’s story is hypothetical, but it depicts a story similar to the real plaintiffs’ stories
from real cases that will be described throughout this Note.
2 Federal and state laws contain provisions that prohibit specific classes of individuals from
owning firearms. These statutes commonly refer to these prohibitions as “disabilities.” See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 925; FLA. STAT. § 790.064 (2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (LexisNexis
2015).
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society, yet he is unable to possess or own a firearm because of his prior time spent in
a psychiatric institution.
Second Amendment rights are a commonly contested issue in the United States. 3
In the wake of gun violence, it is common to see pleas for stricter gun control battling
with vehement support of Second Amendment rights.4 In response to the civil unrest
that has resulted from riots, a presidential election year, and the COVID-19 pandemic,
many people have purchased firearms to protect themselves and their families.5 While
the government does not track firearm sales, it does track background checks that are
required to buy a firearm from a federally licensed dealer.6 The number of background
checks from January to June in 2020 nearly doubled when compared to the same
months in 2019.7 Many of these purchasers were expected to be first time buyers.8
Considering the current unrest and the fact that many people have decided to protect
themselves with firearms in response, Joe’s situation seems unfair on its face.
In the pivotal Second Amendment rights case, District of Columbia v. Heller, the
Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to own
a firearm.9 Ownership is not limited to militia or military uses; instead, it applies to
individuals for the purpose of self-defense of the person and home.10 However, the
Court noted this right is not unlimited, and the outcome of Heller did not invalidate

3 Gun control is listed in the top five issues as “extremely important” in conjunction with
healthcare, terrorism and national security, education, and the economy. Zach Hrynowski,
Several Issues Tie as Most Important in 2020 Election, GALLUP (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/276932/several-issues-tie-important-2020-election.aspx.
4 In response to the Parkland, Florida shooting, many people and states called for gun control
laws. These calls were met with resistance from Second Amendment advocates the NRA, who
would consistently try to undermine any proposed legislation. See Matt Vasilogambros, After
Parkland, States Pass 50 New Gun-Control Laws, PEW CHARITABLE TRS. (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/08/02/afterparkland-states-pass-50-new-gun-control-laws.
5 Chris Arnold, Pandemic and Protests Spark Record Gun Sales, NPR (July 16, 2020, 11:03
AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/16/891608244/protests-and-pandemic-spark-record-gunsales; Marc Fisher et al., America on Edge: Covid Lockdowns, Protests and Election Strife Led
to
Record
Gun
Sales,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
18,
2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/record-gun-sales-us-2020/2021/01/18/d25e861655a9-11eb-a931-5b162d0d033d_story.html.
6 Arnold, supra note 5.
7 The statistics show that 9,851,516 background checks were completed in January through
June 2020 compared to 5,819,681 in January through June 2019. Id.
8 The NSSF surveyed many firearm retailers, which reported that approximately 40% of sales
were to purchasers who have never owned a firearm. Through July that is approximately
5,000,000 new gun owners. First-Time Gun Buyers Grow to Nearly 5 Million in 2020, NAT’L
SHOOTING SPORTS FOUND. (Aug. 24, 2020), https://www.nssf.org/first-time-gun-buyers-growto-nearly-5-million-in-2020/.
9 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
10 Id. at 580–81.
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“presumptively lawful” longstanding prohibitions based on disabilities or prohibitions
on possessing firearms in certain areas, like government buildings or schools. 11 Under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), an individual’s prior involuntary commitment establishes a
firearm disability.12 Despite this strong Supreme Court ruling regarding firearm
ownership rights, Joe would be still unable to purchase a firearm.
Fortunately, there are programs that provide relief from disability, which can
restore an individual’s Second Amendment right to possess a firearm.13
Unfortunately, the programs are a part of an evolving area of law that is composed of
“a confusing and at times contradictory body of federal and state laws.” 14 Further,
despite the existence of these programs, there is potential that Joe could live in a state
that does not provide any opportunity to restore Second Amendments rights because
of the relationship between state and federal laws.15
The combination of the Second Amendment providing a fundamental individual
right to bear arms in the United States, the existence of disabilities that prevent the
ownership and possession of firearms, and the availability (or lack thereof) of relief
from disability poses the legal issue of whether “[i]t is reasonably necessary to forever
ban all previously institutionalized persons from owning a firearm?” 16 This question
has produced a circuit split regarding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
In an as-applied case, the Sixth Circuit held the plaintiff had a viable claim under
the Second Amendment regarding an effective lifetime ban, and the government did
not provide evidence sufficient to justify this ban for an individual with a clean bill of
health who had been committed many years ago.17 Conversely, in a similar case, the
Ninth Circuit held the plaintiff’s ban withstood Second Amendment scrutiny as the
government was able to show a reasonable fit between the § 922(g)(4) prohibition and
furthering its goal of preventing gun violence.18 Finally, the Third Circuit, concluded
the plaintiff’s lifetime ban under § 922(g)(4) was proper and did not burden Second
Amendment rights because mentally ill individuals were traditionally not allowed to
own firearms if they were dangerous to themselves or the public.19 The plaintiff could

11 Id. at 626.
12 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4).
13 Liza H. Gold & Donna Vanderpool, Legal Regulation of Restoration of Firearms Rights
After Mental Health Prohibition, 46 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 298, 298 (2018).
14 Id. at 306.
15 Id. at 303.
16 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 697 (6th Cir. 2016).
17 Id. at 699.
18 Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2020).
19 Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2019). The Third Circuit applied
slightly different analysis than the other circuits. The faults of this analysis will be discussed
below in Part IV.
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not distinguish his circumstances from members of the class of people whom Section
922(g)(4) has historically barred.20
Regarding the circuit split on the § 922(g)(4) permanent ban, the Sixth Circuit
approach is the most persuasive because it balanced the rights of those with a history
of mental illness against the compelling government interests of protecting public
health and safety.21 It properly applied intermediate scrutiny by requiring more
stringent evidence that sufficiently illustrates that previous involuntary commitment
is indicative of mental health issues, justifying the prohibition of firearm ownership
years later.22 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit effectively and improperly applied a
rational basis test, and despite the court’s claim to not be stigmatizing mental health,
the Third Circuit’s test has that exact effect..23 Further, the Sixth Circuit’s finding of
a Second Amendment claim is consistent with the current understanding of the Second
Amendment as well as historical and recent legislative intent.24
Part II of this Note establishes the issue created by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) and the
confusing intersection of state and federal law. Part III discusses the current status of
Second Amendment rights and the two-step analysis commonly used to analyze
constitutional challenges to the Second Amendment. Part IV discusses the circuit split
between the Third, Sixth, and Ninth circuits and how the Tyler decision correctly
applies intermediate scrutiny, considers existing legislation, and balances the rights of
those previously involuntarily committed with the government interest of public
safety. This Note concludes in Part V.
II. THE PERMANENT BAN CREATED BY 18 U.S.C. 922(G)(4)
Despite interpretation of the same statute and virtually the same facts, the Sixth,
Ninth, and Third Circuits have inconsistently interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) and,
in some instances, incorrectly found a constitutional lifetime ban on firearm ownership
created by the statute. District of Columbia v. Heller established an individual right to
own firearms.25 The Court cautioned that the right is not unlimited when it stated
“nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the
carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.”26

20 Id. The court stated that the historically barred class of people that were outside of the
Scope of the Second Amendment were “individuals who were considered dangerous to the
public or to themselves.” Id. at 158.
21 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 699.
22 Id. at 692.
23 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1115; Beers, 927 F.3d at 158 (purporting to apply intermediate scrutiny,
the court in effect applied the rational basis test).
24 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 681–82; Paul S. Appelbaum, Does the Second Amendment Protect the
Gun Rights of Persons with Mental Illness?, 68 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 3, 5 (2017).
25 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008).
26 Id. at 626.
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The Court considered these longstanding prohibitions “presumptively lawful.”27
While it did not explicitly list it, the Court likely considered 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as one
of these presumptively lawful prohibitions.28 Section 922(g)(4), part of the Gun
Control Act of 1968 and the main focus of this Note, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person— . . . (4) who has been adjudicated as a
mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution; . . . to
ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.29
This statute includes prohibitions for other classes of individuals that would be
presumptively lawful as well (e.g., felons, fugitives from justice, persons dishonorably
discharged, and misdemeanants of domestic violence).30 A violation of this statute is
a felony that can lead to penalties of up to ten years in prison and a maximum fine of
$250,000.31
There is minimal historical evidence supporting the exclusion of the mentally ill
from firearm ownership.32 Prohibitions related to firearms are by no means new.
Congress’s power to enact categorical prohibitions was “part of the original meaning”
of the Second Amendment.33 However, “[o]ne [would search] in vain through
eighteenth-century records to find any laws specifically excluding the mentally ill
from firearms ownership.”34 “[L]egal limits on the possession of firearms by the
mentally ill . . . are of 20th Century vintage.”35 Generally, these prohibitions are meant
to protect the public.36 The Supreme Court has stated the purpose of § 922(g) “was to
keep firearms out of the hands of presumptively risky people.”37 Further, the courts

27 Id. at 627 n.26.
28 Id.
29 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
30 Id.
31 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3).
32 Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v.
Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1376 (2009).
33 United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010).
34 Larson, supra note 32, at 1376.
35 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641.
36 Larson, supra note 32, at 1377.
37 Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103, 112 n.6 (1983); see also Huddleston v.
United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974).
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have expressed that § 922 (g)(4) has the added purpose of protecting the community
from crime and preventing suicide.38
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (hereinafter “ATF”)
has defined many of the crucial terms of § 922(g)(4) in 27 C.F.R. § 478.11. 39
“Adjudicated as a mental defective” means:
A determination by a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that
a person, as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental illness,
incompetency, condition, or disease: (1) Is a danger to himself or to others;
or (2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs. 40
This includes findings of insanity by a court in criminal cases and persons found
incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 41 “Committed to a mental institution” means a
“formal commitment of a person to a mental institution by a court, board, commission,
or other lawful authority.”42 It includes involuntary commitment to a mental
institution, but notably does not include voluntary commitment or persons admitted
for observation.43 In addition to commitment for mental defectiveness or mental
illness, it also includes other reasons like drug use.44 The ATF has defined “mental
institution” as “mental health facilities, mental hospitals, sanitariums, psychiatric
facilities, and other facilities that provide diagnoses by licensed professionals of
mental retardation or mental illness, including a psychiatric ward in a general
hospital.”45
To properly understand the implications of the ban § 922(g)(4) imposes, it is
necessary to understand what conduct can lead to involuntary commitment and under
what standard. The Supreme Court considers involuntary commitment, frequently
called civil commitment, to be a “significant deprivation of liberty” that requires due
process of the law protection.46 This deprivation has historically been justified on two
grounds—the policing power and the parens patriae power.47 The policing power

38 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 693 (6th Cir. 2016).
39 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2020).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); see, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,
731 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967).
47 4 JOHN PARRY, TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW § 20.04(1) (2020).
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generally refers to a state’s authority to protect its citizens from harm. 48 The parens
patriae power, Latin for “parent of the people,” refers to a state’s authority to protect
and act as guardian for individuals unable to care for themselves.49 Considering these
justifications, individuals can be involuntarily committed if they are considered
dangerous to themselves or others.50
In Addington v. Texas, the Supreme Court found that the standard of “clear,
unequivocal[,] and convincing” evidence used by the trial court was constitutionally
adequate to find individuals dangerous to themselves or others.51 While
“unequivocal” is not required, states are free to use it in their standard. 52 A mere
standard of preponderance of the evidence could lead to factfinders committing
individuals “solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct.”53 Thus, because
of the potential loss of liberty, the Court found the common civil standard of
preponderance of the evidence to be inadequate.54 The Court refused to apply the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard common to criminal proceedings because, “given
the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot meet
and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical treatment.”55 Therefore,
a person could be involuntarily committed if they are found to be dangerous to
themselves or others by clear and convincing evidence.
There are existing processes, often referred to as “relief from disability” statutes
or programs,56 through which individuals who have been involuntarily committed can
restore their Second Amendment rights. However, there is no universal,
straightforward process as the existing statutes include a confusing intersection of
federal and state laws regarding both prohibitions and restorations of rights.57 Some
states do not have prohibitions related to involuntary commitment, others have similar
prohibitions to § 922(g)(4), and others have prohibitions with stricter standards.58 This
can lead to confusion because of rules requiring federal entities to relieve disabilities

48 Id. § 20.04(1)(b).
49
Parens
Patriae,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
CORNELL
L.
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/parens_patriae (last visited Dec. 2, 2020); e.g., PARRY, supra
note 47, § 20.04(1)(a); Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
50 Involuntary Civil Commitment, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/involuntary_civil_commitment (last visited Dec. 3, 2020).
51 Addington, 441 U.S. at 433.
52 Id. at 432.
53 Id. at 427.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 432.
56 See Gold & Vanderpool, supra note 13, at 298.
57 Id. at 306.
58 Michigan is an example of a state with no prohibitions. Id. at 302. California is an example
of a state with stricter prohibitions. Id. at 299.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss3/8

8

2022]

RESTORATION OF SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS

611

imposed by federal entities, state entities to relieve disabilities imposed by state
entities, and the fact that some state programs can relieve federal disabilities if the
state program meets federal standards and is certified by the ATF.59
The Gun Control Act of 1968 included the possibility of relief from disability for
felons but not individuals who had been involuntarily committed. 60 The Firearm
Owners Protection Act of 1986 amended 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) to allow relief from
disability for any class of persons prohibited under § 922(g). 61 Because of this
amendment, between 1986 and 1992, individuals could petition the Attorney General
through the ATF for the restoration of gun rights. 62 This petition would be granted if
the ATF deemed the individual not likely to endanger public safety and the grant of
relief would not be contrary to the public interest.63 Individuals who were denied relief
could seek judicial review in federal court.64 In 1992, Congress decided to defund this
program because it was “a very difficult and subjective task which could have
devastating consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong decision [was] made.”65
Through this action, Congress nullified the authority of both the ATF and the federal
judiciary to relieve a firearm disability because, in United States v. Bean, the Supreme
Court held that the “absence of actual denial . . . [from the] ATF precludes judicial
review under § 925(c).”66
In 2008, Congress passed the NICS Improvement Amendments Act (hereinafter
“NIAA”).67 While the primary purpose of this statute was to improve state compliance
with the NICS (the National Instant Criminal Background Check System) 68 and
tighten scrutiny and regulations on firearms purchasers, this statute also included
important provisions related to relief.69 First, the Act mandated that all federal
agencies that impose mental health adjudications or involuntary commitments provide
a process for relief from prohibitions.70 Second, the Act provided grant money to

59 Id. at 303–04.
60 Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (amended 1986).
61 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
62 Gold & Vanderpool, supra note 13, at 302.
63 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).
64 Id.
65 S. REP. NO. 102-353, at 19–20 (1992).
66 United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 78 (2002).
67 NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub L. No. 110–180, 121 Stat. 2559 (2008)
(codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 40902–41).
68 The NICS was created by Congress in 1993 as part of the Brady Handgun Violence
Protection Act. Gold & Vanderpool, supra note 13, at 300.
69 Id.
70 NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–180, §101(c)(2)(A), 121
Stat. 2559, 2563 (2008) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 40911).
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states that implemented a disability relief program that was certified by the ATF as
meeting the NIAA’s restoration criteria.71 These state programs, under 34 U.S.C. §
40915, could restore both state and federal firearm rights. 72
Relief from disability programs are not available to citizens in all states, which
creates the possibility of an unjust lifetime ban. Approximately thirty states currently
have relief from disability programs that comply with the NIAA’s standards. 73 States
that do not have a prohibition for involuntarily committed individuals similar to §
922(g)(4), like Michigan, consequently do not have a relief from disability statute that
meets federal standards.74 Other states that do have involuntary commitment
prohibitions do not have NIAA compliant programs.75 These last two types of states
create the issue that there is not a possibility of federal relief for the respective state’s
citizens, effectively creating a permanent ban.76 The circuit split, which is the focus
of this Note, perfectly illustrates the permanent ban issue created by the confusing
system of federal and state laws regarding relief from disability. Ultimately, the Sixth
Circuit provides a potential path forward for individuals facing a permanent ban
through its analysis and treatment of the Second Amendment.77
III. SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
The Sixth Circuit correctly applied the commonly-used Second Amendment
framework in a manner consistent with the current understanding of Second
Amendment rights. The Second Amendment provides, “[a] well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.”78 Considering its inclusion in the Bill of Rights, the
right to possess a firearm has been a fundamental right in the United States since its
inception. As previously stated, the Second Amendment is not unfamiliar with
controversy and questions regarding its scope. However, before Heller in 2008, “the

71 Id. §§ 105(a), 103(c); Delegation Order—Authority to Facilitate Implementation of the
NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,475 (June 22, 2009).
72 Id. See Gold & Vanderpool, supra note 13, at 303 (explaining that where a state has a
certified relief program, federal law provides for the restoration of firearms rights suspended
because of mental health exclusions).
73 BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, GUIDE: NICS IMPROVEMENT
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2007 (2021), https://www.atf.gov/file/155981/download (listing states
that have qualified relief of disability programs that ATF has approved).
74 Gold & Vanderpool, supra note 13, at 301–02.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 303.
77 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 700 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that
the government must justify a lifetime ban on gun possession under § 922(g)(4) with additional
evidence of necessity or that the individual would be a risk to himself or others if he were
allowed to possess a firearm).
78 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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Supreme Court had barely opined on [its] scope.”79 Prior to Heller, the most recent
Supreme Court case on the scope of the Second Amendment was United States v.
Miller in 1939.80 In Miller, the Court addressed a criminal law that banned the
possession of short-barreled shotguns and asked whether it had a “reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”81 This ruling
ignited a “longstanding debate over whether the Second Amendment provides an
individual right to keep and bear arms versus a collective right belonging to the states
to maintain militias.”82
A vast majority of the courts embraced the collective right theory until the
Supreme Court answered the questioned in Heller.83 In Heller, the Plaintiffs, who
were residents of Washington D.C., challenged the constitutionality of a number of
laws governing the ownership, use, and storage of firearms which amounted to a total
ban on handguns and restricted the ability to use guns in the home. 84 With Justice
Antonin Scalia authoring the opinion, the Court analyzed the history of the Second
Amendment and applied a very textualist approach to affirm the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning.85 The first part of the Second Amendment, the prefatory clause, indicates
a purpose for the amendment, but does not limit it just to the militia or military use.86
Additional purposes can be determined from historical rights that existed prior to the
Constitution, primarily self-defense.87 In the second part of the amendment, the
operative clause, the “right of the people,” as used in the Bills of Rights, universally
communicates an individual right.88 Therefore, the Second Amendment protects a
right that is “exercised individually and belongs to all Americans.” 89 The Court held
that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to possess a firearm

79 SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44618, POST-HELLER SECOND AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE, at 1 (Mar. 25, 2019).
80 Id.
81 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
82 PECK, supra note 79, at 1.
83 Id.
84 The District of Columbia had laws that effectively prohibited the possession of handguns,
as it is a crime to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns was prohibited.
It also required guns to be stored unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock in the
owner’s home. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–76 (2008).
85 Id. at 578–95.
86 “A prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.” Id.
87 The Court discussed how the right to own firearms was not tied to military service in
England, preexisted the founding of the country, and developed out of a need for protection
from public and private violence. Id. at 592–94.
88 Id. at 579–80.
89 Id. at 579–81.
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unconnected with service in a militia or military and an individual right to use that
firearm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.90
Applying this logic to the facts of the case, the Court held that the District’s ban
on handgun possession in the home and its prohibition against storing lawfully owned
firearms readily operable in the home for the purposes of immediate self-defense
violated the Second Amendment.91 The Court also distinguished its new ruling from
Miller by determining that the prior case primarily addressed the types of weapons
eligible for Second Amendment protection.92
Because Heller involved a challenge of the District of Columbia law and not a
state law, the question of whether Heller applied to the states was out of the reach of
the Court, and the Court left it unanswered.93 This question was important because
the Bill of Rights originally applied to only the Federal Government and federal court
cases.94 States could adopt similar laws, but were not obligated to do so.95 Using the
incorporation doctrine, the Court can make provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 96 The
Court addressed this issue in McDonald v. City of Chicago when it reaffirmed the
Second Amendment rights defined in Heller, and found that the right to keep and bear
arms was incorporated and made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.97
A.

The Two-Step Analysis Framework

The following cases challenge the constitutionality of § 922(g)(4). It is important
to distinguish between facial challenges and as-applied challenges. Under a facial
challenge, the challenger is arguing that no application of the statute would be
constitutional.98 Conversely, under an as-applied challenge, the challenger argues that

90 Id. at 580–81, 626, 635; see PECK, supra note 79, at 1 (“The Supreme Court’s landmark 54 decision in Heller . . . [held] that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to
possess firearms for historically lawful purposes, such as self-defense in the home.”).
91 Id. at 630.
92 Id. at 622.
93 Id. at 620 n.23 (noting the incorporation question has not been presented in this case).
94
Incorporation
Doctrine,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
CORNELL
L.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/incorporation_doctrine (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).

SCH.,

95 Id.
96 The Due Process Clause is a legal obligation of all states and says a “state [shall not]
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
97 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2010); Incorporation Doctrine,
supra note 94, at 1.
98 Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 657, 657 (2010).
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the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him/her because of his/her particular
circumstances, even though the statute may otherwise be constitutional. 99
The Third, Sixth, and Ninth circuits all used virtually the same framework to
decide their respective as-applied challenges of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), yet all the cases
produced different results despite similar facts. It is an appropriate choice considering
other circuits have adopted this two-step framework to address Second Amendment
challenges, including challenges to other provisions of § 922(g).100 The first step “asks
whether the challenged law burdens conduct that falls within the scope of the Second
Amendment right, as historically understood [when the Bill of Rights was
ratified].”101 In the first step, the government has to establish that the challenged law
regulates activity outside of the scope of the Second Amendment as understood when
the Bill of Rights was ratified for it to be unprotected.102 However, if the historical
evidence is inconclusive or suggests that the regulated activities or individuals are not
categorically unprotected, then the court moves to the next step. 103 In the second step,
the court must decide and apply the appropriate level of scrutiny.104 This decision
should be based on: “(1) ‘how close the law comes to the core of the Second
Amendment right,’ and (2) ‘the severity of the law’s burden on the right.’”105
It is briefly worth discussing the options for the level of scrutiny applied to the
constitutional challenges. The level of scrutiny changes with the subject of the law
because certain liberties or classes of people are more highly protected than others.106
Rational-basis review is very deferential to Congress and laws typically survive this
level of review as long as they are rationally related to a legitimate government
interest.107 Intermediate scrutiny requires the law to be substantially related to an

99 Id.
100 See United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010).
101 Greeno, 679 F.3d at 518.
102 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 685–86 (6th Cir. 2016).
103 Id. at 686.
104 Id.
105 United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ezell v. City of
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011)).
106 Randall R. Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related
Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and Modern
Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225, 229 n.20 (2002).
107 Marium Morshedi, Levels of Scrutiny, SUBSCRIPT L. (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.subscriptlaw.com/blog/levels-of-scrutiny; Rational Basis Test, LEGAL INFO. INST.:
CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/rational_basis_test (last visited Dec. 2,
2020).
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important interest of the government.108 Finally, strict scrutiny requires the law to be
narrowly tailored to a compelling government issue. 109
The circuits that reached the second step, the Sixth and the Ninth circuits, both
applied intermediate scrutiny. Surviving intermediate scrutiny requires: “(1) the
government’s stated objective to be significant, substantial, or important; and (2) a
reasonable fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective.”110 In
Heller, the Court ruled out rational-basis scrutiny because, under that standard of
review, the Second Amendment would have no effect.111 Strict scrutiny is typically
applied to government actions in cases where fundamental rights have been restricted
like discrimination on the base of race or religion, restriction on freedom of speech,
and restriction of voting.112 Notably, this does not include the Second Amendment’s
right to own a firearm.113 Thus, the courts’ selection of intermediate scrutiny is
appropriate, especially because many of the other circuit courts have selected
intermediate scrutiny when analyzing the constitutionality of other § 922(g)
provisions.114 As this Note will illustrate below, the intermediate scrutiny test is
largely a question of evidence and whether the government’s proffered evidence
supports its interest in a way that justifies the restriction of an individual’s Second
Amendment right.
In summary, the Supreme Court has determined that the Second Amendment
provides an individual right to possess a firearm for lawful purposes that is subject to
limitations.115 For example, the Second Amendment does not confer a right to possess
any kind of weapon for whatever reason.116 Citizens cannot own what are considered

108 Id.; Intermediate Scrutiny, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL L.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intermediate_scrutiny (last updated Dec. 2, 2020).

SCH.,

109 Morshedi, supra note 107; Strict Scrutiny, LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL L. SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny (last updated Dec. 2, 2020).
110 Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139 (internal citation omitted).
111 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 n.27 (2008).
112 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1267, 1268–69 (2007).
113 Adam Joseph Neuman, Drawing New Conclusions: Is the Second Amendment a
Fundamental Right?, FELS INST. OF GOV’T, UNIV. OF PA. (Feb. 6, 2017),
https://www.fels.upenn.edu/recap/posts/846 (explaining that the right to bear arms is not a
fundamental right).
114 See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying intermediate
scrutiny in challenge to § 922(g)(9)); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011)
(applying the equivalent of intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(9)); United States v. Staten, 666
F.3d 154, 159–60 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny in challenge to § 922(g)(9));
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny in
challenge to § 922(g)(9)); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010)
(applying intermediate scrutiny in challenge to § 922(g)(1)).
115 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
116 Id.
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dangerous and unusual weapons (e.g., machine guns and destructive devices).117
Another allowable limitation that has been upheld by the courts is the ability of the
government to restrict the possession or carrying of firearms in certain places like
government buildings or schools.118 Finally, the Court in Heller stated that the
existing prohibitions on ownership, including the prohibition that is the focus of this
Note under § 922(g)(4), are presumptively lawful.119
The fact that existing long-standing prohibitions are presumptively lawful
seemingly defeats the position that the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of § 922(g)(4) is
the most persuasive, and courts have in fact used this presumption to dispose of similar
cases.120 However, the fact that the Court states there is a presumption of lawfulness
logically implies that there is a possibility that a ban could also be considered
unconstitutional under the Second Amendment in some cases. 121 If this were not the
case, the Court would simply have made a blanket statement that permanent lifetime
bans on specified classes are constitutional. Or otherwise stated, the Court could have
said that the classes of § 922(g), and specifically those who have been involuntarily
committed which fall under subsection (g)(4), are categorically unprotected by the
Second Amendment.
The following Part addresses how some of the federal circuits have addressed the
permanent ban created by § 922(g)(4). Specifically, it discusses the Third and Ninth
Circuits’ failure to correctly apply the previously described framework and the Sixth
Circuit’s application of the two-step framework, which ultimately resulted in a Second
Amendment claim against the ban.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

The 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) Permanent Ban Circuit Split

The states’ different treatment of disability from involuntary commitment and
relief from disability has created a circuit split. Considering the similarity in facts and
circumstances between Tyler, Mai, and Beers (e.g., prior involuntary commitment,
elapsed time, and a physician finding their patient having a clean bill of health), it is
reasonable to expect that all the cases would reach the same result. However, all the
cases produced drastically different results. On one side, the Sixth Circuit has
recognized there is a Second Amendment claim for those who have been previously
117 Id. at 627. The National Firearms Act was originally passed in 1934 and has been
amended over the years. It defines and regulates a variety of different types of weapons—
commonly called “NFA weapons or items.” For instance, the act bans machine guns and
destructive devices and restricts the ownership of short barreled rifles (a rifle that has a barrel
less than eighteen inches long) and silencers. National Firearms Act, ATF (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/national-firearms-act; Main 80 Percent Lower Laws,
80% ARMS, (Dec. 28, 2021) https://www.80percentarms.com/blog/maine-80-percent-lowerlaws/.
118 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
119 Id. at 626.
120 Tyler v. Holder, No. 12-CV-523, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11511, at *10–12 (W.D. Mich.
Jan. 29, 2013).
121 United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010).
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committed.122 On the other side, the Ninth and the Third Circuits have decided the
permanent ban created by § 922(g)(4) survives constitutional scrutiny. 123 The Sixth
Circuit correctly applied Second Amendment analysis and balanced government
interests against individual rights of people with a history of mental health issues when
it found some individuals who were previously committed had a Second Amendment
claim when facing a lifetime prohibition under § 922(g)(4).124
1.

The Third Circuit Improperly Determined § 922(g)(4) Does Not Burden
Second Amendment Rights

In Beers v. Attorney General of the United States, the Third Circuit incorrectly
determined that § 922(g)(4) does not burden conduct falling within the scope of the
Second Amendment and perpetuated the stigmatization of mental illness.125 The court
concluded that § 922(g)(4) was constitutional because, as applied to the Plaintiff
Beers, it did not burden conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment
because he was unable to distinguish his circumstances from the historically-barred
class.126 Beers was a young man who was involuntarily committed in December 2005
after he told his mother he was suicidal and put a gun in his mouth.127 A Pennsylvania
court extended his commitment twice because it concluded Beers presented a danger
to himself and others.128 Shortly after his discharge in 2006, Beers attempted to
purchase a firearm and was rejected due to the disability on his record. 129 Beers had
not required any mental health treatment since his 2006 discharge, and a physician
who examined Beers in 2013 thought Beers would be able to safely handle firearms
again.130 Beers appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted a writ of certiorari and
later remanded the case to Third Circuit to dismiss as moot. 131
The Third Circuit used a modified version of the two-step analysis which
ultimately led to a drastically different result than the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. The
Plaintiff had to: “(1) identify the traditional justifications for excluding from Second
Amendment protections the class of which he appears to be a member, and then (2)
present facts about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from

122 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 699 (6th Cir. 2016).
123 Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2019); Mai v. United States, 952
F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2020).
124 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 699.
125 Beers, 927 F.3d at 158.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 152.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 822 Fed. App’x 56, 57 (3d Cir. 2020).
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those of persons in the historically barred class” of mentally ill individuals. 132 If the
Plaintiff satisfied this test, the burden would have shifted to the government to
demonstrate the statute satisfies intermediate scrutiny.133 The Plaintiff was unable to
do this because “[t]raditionally, individuals who were considered dangerous to the
public or to themselves were outside of the scope of Second Amendment protection”
and he plainly fell within the described class of § 922(g)(4) since he had been
involuntarily committed.134
In the analyzed cases, the courts looked for evidence justifying the prohibition of
those who have been involuntarily committed and they often relied on historical
evidence.135 The Third Circuit relied on historical evidence when applying the first
step in the analysis.136 On one hand this is proper to determine the considerations of
the Founders who passed the Second Amendment and the Legislatures who passed
later laws like § 922(g). However, on the other hand, this approach can be very
damaging to the case of individuals with a history of mental illness. The Second
Amendment was ratified over 200 years ago and § 922(g) became law over 50 years
ago.137 Similar to many other areas of medicine, society’s understanding of mental
health and associated physiological and biological processes is magnitudes greater
then when either of these laws passed.138 Courts tend to rely on historical evidence
when analyzing Second Amendment issues, and this historical evidence can be
insightful to the understanding of the subject of the law when the law was enacted.
However, regarding mental illness and § 922(g)(4) specifically, because of the current
understanding of mental illness and the fact that rehabilitation is vastly different than
even twenty-five years ago, it should be given very little weight.
132 Beers, 927 F.3d at 155.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 157, 159.
135 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–98 (2008) (using historical
evidence to establish the meaning of the prefatory and operative clauses of the Second
Amendment); Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 688–89 (6th Cir. 2016)
(analyzing the scope of the Second Amendment as historically understood); Beers, 927 F.3d at
157–58 (reviewing the “traditional” justifications for prohibiting the mentally ill from
possessing firearms).
136 Beers, 927 F.3d at 157–58.
137 The Bills of Rights was ratified in 1791. The Bill of Rights, NAT’L ARCHIVES (Oct. 7,
2021),
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights/how-did-ithappen#:~:text=On%20October%202%2C%201789%2C%20President,the%20%E2%80%9C
Bill%20of%20Rights.%E2%80%9D. Section 922(g)(4) was a part of the Gun Control Act of
1968. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (enacted 1968).
138 David Mechanic, Mental Health Services Then and Now, 26 HEALTH AFFS. 1548, 1548
(2007) (“Over the past twenty-five years, psychiatric services have shifted from hospital to
community. Managed care reinforces this trend. Mental illness is better understood and less
stigmatized, and services are more commonly used.”). See also Nick Venters, The Past, Present
and Future of Innovation in Mental Health, NHS DIGIT. (July 20, 2018),
https://digital.nhs.uk/blog/transformation-blog/2018/the-past-present-and-future-ofinnovation-in-mental-health.
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The Third Circuit used Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language and essentially
reduced the question to simply if individuals fell into the statutorily enumerated class.
As discussed below, this language is not meant to be conclusive.139 The court
essentially said the only way to show § 922(g)(4) burdened Second Amendment rights
was to not be a member of the class. 140 Time and rehabilitation were not relevant to
the court’s consideration at all.141 This is perhaps the court’s biggest flaw because this
simple logic is very demeaning and perpetuates the stigmatization of mental health
issues.
2.

The Ninth Circuit Seemingly Applies Rational Basis Scrutiny Instead of
Intermediate Scrutiny

The Ninth Circuit also addressed § 922(g)(4) in Mai v. United States and arguably
applied a rational basis test rather than intermediate scrutiny.142 It held that the
continued application of § 922(g)(4) to plaintiff Mai survived Second Amendment
intermediate scrutiny and was constitutional as applied to him.143 In 1999, a
Washington state court involuntarily committed Mai for over nine months when he
was seventeen years old because he was deemed mentally ill and dangerous.144 Since
his release in 2000, Mai earned multiple degrees, was gainfully employed, had a
family, and lived a “socially responsible, well-balanced, and accomplished life.”145
According to Mai, he no longer suffered from mental illness, and, as a result, in 2014
he was able to restore his Second Amendment rights under Washington State Law.146
However, Washington’s relief program is not certified by the ATF, so Mai was still
prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal law and had no avenue for relief.147
The district court granted the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, holding that § 922(4)(g) is categorically constitutional under the Second
Amendment in addition to it satisfying intermediate scrutiny.148 On appeal, the Ninth

139 See infra Part IV.A.3.
140 Beers, 927 F.3d at 156.
141 Id.
142 Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1121 (9th Cir. 2020).
143 Id.
144 Id. at 1110.
145 Id.
146 Id.; See WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 9.41.047(3) (2020) (allowing persons to petition for
relief of disability and courts to grant relief on findings of: “[1] The petitioner is no longer
required to participate in court-ordered inpatient or outpatient treatment; [2] The petitioner has
successfully managed the condition related to his commitment; [3] The petitioner no longer
presents a substantial danger to himself, or the public; and [4] The symptoms related to the
commitment are not reasonably likely to recur”).
147 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1112.
148 Id.
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Circuit assumed that § 922(g)(4) burdened Second Amendment rights and reasoned
that § 922(4)(g) is narrowly tailored to those who were found actually dangerous
through procedures satisfying due process, and thus the prohibition is a reasonable fit
for the important goal of reducing gun violence.149 Therefore, the court found that the
lifetime prohibition was constitutional as applied to the plaintiff. 150
Rather than analyzing the first step of the Second Amendment framework and
despite mentioning the government’s strong argument, the Ninth Circuit in Mai just
assumed that § 922(g)(4) burdened Second Amendment rights as applied to the
plaintiff.151 The court applied intermediate scrutiny because § 922(g)(4)’s prohibition
falls outside of the core Second Amendment right of self-defense for law-abiding,
responsible citizens and the lifetime ban was substantial.152
The Ninth Circuit’s application of intermediate scrutiny in the second step and its
acceptance of the government’s evidence is concerning. First, the government
presented its interest as some variant of keeping firearms out of the hands of
presumptively risky people, protecting the public from gun violence, and preventing
suicide.153 These interests are “compelling,” and it is not contentious that they satisfy
the first prong of intermediate scrutiny.154 In the second step, the court showed
deference to Congressional decision-making when it accepted the government’s
scientific evidence that fairly supported Congress’s reasonable conclusions that led to
the prohibition under § 922(g)(4).155 Thus, there was a reasonable fit between the
prohibition and preventing the important goal of reducing gun violence and the
prohibition withstood Second Amendment scrutiny.156
The use of “deference” and “fairly” in describing its analysis indicates more of a
rational basis test or reads like the “plausible reasons” that the Sixth Circuit flatly
rejects in Tyler.
The plaintiff’s evidence showed the risk that diminished over time but not that the
risk ever disappeared.157 Conversely, the government’s scientific evidence showed a
general increased risk of suicide, often a short time after involuntary commitment,
based on prior involuntary commitment, which the Ninth Circuit ultimately
accepted.158

149 Id. at 1121.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1115.
152 Id. (noting further that intermediate scrutiny has applied to other lifetime bans under §
922(g)).
153 Id. at 1116; Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 693 (6th Cir. 2016).
154 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 693.
155 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1118.
156 Id. at 1120–21.
157 Id. at 1119.
158 Id. at 1117.
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The acceptance of the government’s evidence imposed an unfair burden on the
plaintiff since it suffered from the same issue as the evidence presented to the Sixth
Circuit in Tyler below—a lack of evidentiary support that the risk with which
Congress is concerned would remain high many years after involuntary
commitment.159 Despite this issue, the Ninth Circuit imposed the high burden of
showing that risk of mental illness or suicide is completely nonexistent in the
plaintiff.160 This burden seems unfair when compared to the burden of clear and
convincing evidence that the individual is dangerous to themselves or others required
by due process to involuntarily commit an individual established by Addington.161
The plaintiff’s burden is seemingly equivalent to beyond a reasonable doubt, which is
typically reserved for criminal cases. This is especially concerning because none of
the plaintiffs in any of the cases discussed committed any crimes.
3.

The Sixth Circuit Applies Intermediate Scrutiny and Finds a Valid Second
Amendment Claim

The Sixth Circuit held that the government had not carried its burden to establish
a reasonable fit between the important goals of reducing crime and suicides and §
922(g)(4)’s permanent ban, and thus, the Plaintiff Tyler had a viable claim under the
Second Amendment.162 Tyler was a seventy-four-year-old man who was involuntarily
committed for two to four weeks in 1986 after his wife of twenty-three years divorced
him and left him emotionally distraught.163 Worried about their father, his daughters
called the police, and a Michigan probate court found by clear and convincing
evidence that he was mentally ill and could injure himself or others.164 After his
discharge, Tyler resumed normal life, held a job for approximately twenty years,
remarried, and had a good relationship with his daughters and ex-wife. His doctors,
who completed substance-abuse and psychological evaluations in 2012, reported
Tyler had no signs of mental illness years after his involuntary commitment. 165 In
2011, Tyler unsuccessfully appealed to the FBI after an unsuccessful attempt to
purchase a firearm.166 He later sued multiple state and federal defendants on the
grounds that § 922(g)(4) was unconstitutional as applied to him because Michigan’s
lack of relief from disabilities program was essentially a permanent ban.167
Before using the Second Amendment two-step framework, the Sixth Circuit
briefly analyzed Heller and determined it did not provide an answer to the
159 Id. at 1118–19.
160 Id. at 1119.
161 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
162 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 699 (6th Cir. 2016).
163 Id. at 683.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 683–84.
166 Id. at 684.
167 Id.
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constitutionality of § 922(g)(4).168 The court did this primarily to overturn the lower
court, which dismissed the plaintiff’s case based on the Supreme Court’s
“presumptively lawful” dictum regarding longstanding prohibitions from Heller.169
The district court relied on this dictum to dismiss the case, and alternatively stated the
statute would survive intermediate scrutiny.170 However, the Sixth Circuit refused to
dispose of the case on Heller’s presumptively lawful language and disagreed with the
lower court in determining § 922(g)(4) would not survive intermediate scrutiny. 171
The Sixth Circuit noted that this language is “precautionary, not conclusive” and
decided that Heller’s dictum does not “foreclose § 922(g)(4) from constitutional
scrutiny.”172 This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court expressly reserving
explorations of historical justifications of these “presumptively lawful” bans to later
cases in Heller.173 Thus, Tyler had a Second Amendment claim to challenge the
constitutionality of this statute as applied to him.174
In Tyler, the Sixth Circuit stated that some sort of showing must be made to justify
Congress’s adoption of prior involuntary commitments as a basis for categorical,
permanent prohibition of Second Amendment rights. 175 To show that § 922(g)(4)
didn’t burden conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment, the
government presented evidence from historical sources and historical scholarship
stating that disarming people wouldn’t be allowed if they were “peaceable citizens,”
“virtuous citizens,” or unless there was “a real danger of public injury from
individuals.”176 None of the sources provided direct support that previously
involuntarily committed individuals were considered when the Bill of Rights was
created, and thus the conduct did not fall outside of the scope of Second Amendment
rights.177
The Sixth and Ninth Circuit courts in Tyler and Mai, respectively, moved to the
second step of the analysis, while the Third Circuit’s analysis prematurely stopped at
the first step. The Sixth Circuit properly considered that there is minimal historical
evidence specifically regarding mental illness when the Bill of Rights was ratified.178
The Sixth Circuit determined that the “better option” is to determine whether a

168 Id. at 686–87.
169 Id. at 689.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 687–88.
172 Id. at 686–87.
173 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
174 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 699.
175 Id. at 688.
176 Id. at 689.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 689.
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regulation presumptively satisfies a heightened level of scrutiny, as opposed to simply
concluding § 922(g)(4) does not burden conduct in the scope of the Second
Amendment because of a Supreme Court observation that a regulation is
presumptively lawful.179 “[P]eople who have been involuntarily committed are not
categorically unprotected by the Second Amendment,” and therefore there is a
possibility that they can exercise their individual Second Amendment right.180
The Sixth Circuit dismissed strict scrutiny and properly selected intermediate
scrutiny as the test to address the plaintiff’s § 922(g)(4) permanent ban. 181 The court
noted that reviewing under strict scrutiny would also be improper because it would
restrict Congress’s power to categorically prohibit presumptively dangerous people
from gun ownership.182 Further it would invert Heller’s presumption that prohibitions
against the mentally ill are lawful.183 Section 922(g)(4) is a severe restriction, but it
does not burden the general public. Rather, it is narrowly applied to those who are not
at the core of the Second Amendment right.184 Thus, the court selected intermediate
scrutiny because “[s]ection 922(g)(4) does not burden the core of the Second
Amendment right, but it does place a substantial burden on conduct and persons
protected by the Second Amendment.”185
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits split on the second prong of the intermediate scrutiny
test—whether the government established a reasonable fit between its presented
interest and the permanent ban imposed by § 922(g)(4). In Tyler, the Sixth Circuit
stated “some evidence of the continuing need to disarm those long ago adjudicated
mentally ill is necessary to justify” the ban.186 Numerous plausible reasons would not
suffice.187 The government presented legislative history and empirical evidence but
ultimately failed to carry its burden in providing evidence to establish a reasonable fit
between § 922(g)(4) and a permanent ban of individuals who had been previously
involuntary committed and now appear to have a clean bill of mental health.188
In their application of intermediate scrutiny, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits analyzed
similar evidence but yielded different results, which is an indication that the courts
actually applied different tests. In Tyler, the Sixth Circuit considered legislative
history linking mental illness and individuals who had recently been involuntarily

179 Id. at 690.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 691.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 692.
186 Id. at 694.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 699.
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committed to tragic shootings.189 Further, it reviewed empirical studies linking mental
health and involuntary commitment to gun violence and suicide risk. 190 The Sixth
Circuit found that this evidence was appropriate to justify § 922(g)(4)’s ban against
someone who had recently been involuntarily committed, but the evidence did not
indicate a continued risk for someone like the Plaintiff who was involuntarily
committed many years ago and had no intervening mental health issues. 191 Since §
922(g)(4) imposes a lifetime ban on a fundamental constitutional right, more sufficient
evidence is required to justify such a severe restriction.192 Thus, the statute did not
survive intermediate scrutiny and Tyler had a viable Second Amendment claim that
the district court could address on remand.193
All of the courts used a similar analysis framework and the Sixth and Ninth
Circuits both claimed to have applied intermediate scrutiny, which conforms with the
current body of law surrounding the Second Amendment. However, the Sixth Circuit
stands apart from the others when considering subtleties in its analysis. Primarily, the
court does not rely on the Supreme Court’s dictum of “presumptively lawful”
prohibitions as a conclusive factor like the Ninth and Third Circuits. Rather, it properly
uses the Heller’s dictum as precatory language that guides its analysis in exploring the
historical justifications of bans, the constitutionality of which the Supreme Court did
not mean to decide in Heller. The court actually scrutinizes and strives to find a
reasonable fit between § 922(g)(4)’s prohibition and the proffered evidence. 194 The
Sixth Circuit properly applied intermediate scrutiny and found that those previously
involuntarily committed may have a Second Amendment claim against the permanent
ban imposed by § 922(g)(4) as applied to their circumstances. 195
Stated simply, the Sixth Circuit’s decision that there was a Second Amendment
claim against the lifetime ban imposed by § 922(g)(4) provides a path forward for
those who have been involuntarily committed in the past. This is particularly important
because this path forward is needed for approximately twenty states that do not have
relief from disability programs.196 Conversely, the other circuits’ decisions prevent
the restoration of fundamental constitutional rights for the same class of people and
perpetuate the stigmatization of those who have a history of mental illness. This is
most apparent when looking at the evidence used to support the respective decisions.
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Tyler most closely conforms with Second
Amendment rights established by Heller and the common treatment of those rights.
The expectation that the same facts and evidence under the same framework would
189 Id. at 694–95.
190 Id. at 695–96.
191 Id. at 695–96, 699.
192 Id. at 699.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 693.
195 Id. at 699.
196 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, NICS Improvement Amendments
Act of 2007, ATF (July 7, 2021), https://www.atf.gov/file/155981/download.
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produce similar results again is emphasized but not realized. The Sixth Circuit
analyzed the government’s evidence and found it insufficient to justify a lifetime ban
rather than allowing a permanent ban that arguably stigmatizes mental health
issues.197 Finally, in reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit balanced the compelling
government issues of preventing gun violence and crime and preventing suicide. 198
B.

The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Properly Considers Previous Legislation and
the Rights of Those with a History of Mental Illness

The Sixth Circuit was the only court in the circuit split to actually give any weight
to the legislative record and the rights of those with a history of mental illness. 199
Considering this circuit split arises out of statutory interpretation, it is worthwhile to
look at legislation that Congress and state legislatures have passed. One important
distinction is that § 922(g)(4) applies to those who have been involuntarily committed,
but not to voluntarily committed persons or persons admitted for observation.200 Many
of these individuals could be suffering from the same level of mental illness, but
Congress has limited the effect of this statue to involuntary commitment.201 Under the
statutory interpretation canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, this indicates
that Congress does not believe all instances of mental illness justify a permanent ban
on firearm ownership to prevent gun violence and suicide.202
As previously mentioned, Congress has historically allowed for relief from
disability created by § 922(g). Various firearms acts have supported relief over the
years by continuously increasing opportunities for relief. Most recently, as part of the
NIAA, Congress enacted 34 U.S.C. § 40915, which allows states to set up relief from
disability programs that could relieve the disability imposed by § 922(g)(4).203
According to the Ninth Circuit, this statute is political compromise and mere
Congressional “grace” that was required to pass the NIAA.204 The Sixth Circuit takes
a vastly different position—that § 40195 was an indication that Congress does not
believe previously committed individuals are sufficiently dangerous as a class which
would justify a lifetime ban.205 Considering previous acts like the Gun Control Act of

197 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 697.
198 Id. at 699.
199 Id. at 697.
200 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2020).
201 Id.
202 This statutory canon of construction provides that to express or include one thing implies
the exclusion of the other or of the alternative. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Because Congress specifically included involuntary
commitment, it is implied that Congress did include voluntary commitment in the law and
further that not all mental illness justified the prohibition of the possession of firearms.
203 34 U.S.C. § 40915.
204 Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2020).
205 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 697.
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1968206 and the Firearm Owners Protection Act207 also displayed Congress’s
willingness to offer relief from disability, the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning is more
persuasive. A counterargument to this point is that Congress has defunded the relief
from disability program created under the Firearm Owners Protection Act. 208 While
this is true, legislative history indicates Congress defunded it because it was difficult
for the ATF to administer, not because Congress intended to create a lifetime
prohibition.209
While Congress has created the opportunity for relief from disability, the NIAA
essentially created a confusing, patchwork, and unfair system of relief from disability
that grants relief to some individuals and not others.210 This is illustrated simply by
the cases in this circuit split. The Plaintiff in Mai was able to restore state firearms
rights, but not federal firearms rights.211 In Tyler, the Sixth Circuit acknowledges that
the Plaintiff’s state is one of the states that have not created an NIAA compliant relief
from disability program, resulting in a lifetime ban.212 The court does provide a
potential remedy through finding a Second Amendment claim, but the case highlights
the inefficiency of this process.213 It illustrates the unfairness of the system and the
need for a more unified body of law establishing relief from disability programs
applicable to all states.
The Third and Ninth Circuits’ decisions perpetuate the stigmatization of mental
illness. The Ninth Circuit closed it decision by stating, “[w]e emphatically do not
subscribe to the notion that ‘once mentally ill, always so’” and even accepted that the
Plaintiff is no longer mentally ill. 214 Similarly, the Third Circuit, the court that is the
least persuasive and arguably the most damaging to the rights of individuals who have
been previously committed, closes its opinion with similar language. It stated,
“[n]othing in our opinion should be read as perpetuating the stigma surrounding
mental illness.”215 However, this statement seems rather contradictory to, or at least
in contention with, the analysis and final disposition of the case. Crucially, the analysis

206 The Gun Control Act of 1968 provided the possibility of relief for felons but not those
who had been involuntarily committed. Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (amended
1986).
207 The Firearm Owners Protection Act amended the Gun Control act to include the
possibility of relief from disability for all disabilities created under 18 U.S.C § 922(g). Id. §
925(c).
208 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1111.
209 S. REP. NO. 102-353 (1992).
210 Gold & Vanderpool, supra note 13, at 306.
211 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1110.
212 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 2016).
213 Id. at 699.
214 Mai, 952 F.3d at 1121.
215 Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 159 (3d Cir. 2019).
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in Beers indicated the only way to show § 922(g)(4) burdened Second Amendment
rights was to not be a member of the class.216 Time and rehabilitation were not
remotely relevant to the court’s consideration.217 Otherwise stated, once a person has
been placed in the prohibited class there is no way to remove their disability. Despite
the court’s well-intentioned dictum at the end of its decision,218 the implication from
the court’s analysis is simple; a person can never recover from their mental illness that
led to their involuntary commitment.
Under § 922(g)(4) involuntary commitment is treated as a proxy for mental
illness.219 Rather than continuing the stigmatization of mental illness by implying that
individuals that were previously involuntarily committed cannot return to the status of
lawful, responsible individuals, the Sixth Circuit has provided a potential path forward
to individuals who otherwise might face a lifetime ban. 220 Congress has indicated
support for relief from disability through the various acts it has passed over the
years.221 It stands to reason that, absent substantial evidence that there is a continued
risk for individuals like the plaintiffs in these cases, a clean bill of health and a clean
record justify the possibility of restoring the individual Second Amendment right
available to lawful and responsible citizens of the United States.
C.

The Sixth Circuit Balances the Rights of Those Previously Involuntarily
Committed with Compelling Government Interests

While the Sixth Circuit’s decision is partially pro-Second Amendment, a position
subject to public disapproval, the court is not dismissive of the government interests
of preventing crime and suicide. This Note discusses Second Amendment rights and
the rights of those with a history of mental health issues. On their own, both of these
topics can be controversial. The combination of the two rights has potential to make
them even more controversial. For this reason, it is important to emphasize the need
to balance these rights with the rights and safety of the general public. The Supreme
Court has said that the primary general purpose of § 922(g) is “to keep firearms out of
the hands of presumptively risky people."222 In Tyler, the Sixth Circuit quoted this
and the government proffered additional interests more specifically related to §
922(g)(4)—protecting the community from crime and preventing suicide.223 The

216 Id. at 156.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 159.
219 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 700 (6th Cir. 2016) (White, J.,
concurring).
220 Id. at 699 (majority opinion).
221 Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 925(c) (amended 1986).
222 Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., 460 U.S. 103, 112 n.6 (1983).
223 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 693.
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court is mindful of how important these interests are and considers them
“compelling.”224
This Note does not contend that § 922(g)(4) fails to serve these compelling
interests. There is no doubt that the statute’s purpose of preventing crime and suicide
is important and would survive many as-applied constitutional challenges even under
the ruling from the Sixth Circuit. For instance, the Plaintiff in Beers from the Third
Circuit attempted to purchase a firearm shortly after being released from involuntary
commitment.225 As discussed above, the Sixth Circuit indicated that the government’s
evidence better supported a ban on recently released individuals. 226 Thus, the result
of Tyler is reasonably limited to individuals with similar circumstances to the Plaintiff
in Tyler, primarily those who are years removed from their involuntary commitment
with a clean bill of health. The Tyler result would seem to exclude people trying to
purchase firearms shortly after involuntary commitment like in Beers, who admittedly
fall within the concerns and original purpose of the statute as indicated by the
empirical evidence in both Mai and Tyler. Ultimately, this Note focuses on the unfair
and confusing body of state and federal law, including § 922(g)(4), and relief from
disability and emphasizes, as the Sixth Circuit does, that better empirical evidence is
required to support a lifetime ban of fundamental Second Amendment rights.
One significant way the courts and the parties balanced these government interests
against the individual rights in question is through their selection of constitutionality
challenge. These cases did not question whether the statutory prohibition was
unconstitutional facially, but rather the parties challenged whether the ban was
unconstitutional as applied to them and their specific situation. 227 While this
narrowness could be burdensome to the judicial system, § 922(g)(4) being held
facially unconstitutional would contradict Heller and undermine the government’s
compelling interests.
The Sixth Circuit agrees and acknowledges this in several ways. First, the court
assumed that § 922(g)(4) is one of the presumptively lawful statutes that the Supreme
Court references in Heller.228 Second, in its selection of intermediate scrutiny, the
court recognized that Congress has the power to categorically prohibit certain
presumptively dangerous people from firearm ownership.229 Third, the court
considers the evidence presented by the government good justification for prohibiting
recently committed individuals from owning firearms.230 Finally, the court states that
Plaintiff has a Second Amendment claim as applied to him, not that § 922(g)(4) is

224 Id.
225 Beers v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150, 153 (3d Cir. 2019).
226 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 695–96, 699.
227 Id. at 684; Beers, 927 F.3d at 153; Mai v. United States, 952 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir.
2020).
228 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 688.
229 Id. at 691.
230 Id. at 695.
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unconstitutional.231 It is possible that another individual under slightly different facts
would not receive this treatment from the court. While the outcome in Tyler is an
important step toward the restoration of Second Amendment rights, there is still a
possibility that the government produces more sufficient evidence on remand which
would result in the ban being constitutional.
In summary, in holding the Plaintiff had a Second Amendment right while still
maintaining the general constitutionality of § 922(g)(4), the Sixth Circuit balanced the
Plaintiff’s individual Second Amendment right with the government’s interest of
keeping firearms out of the hands of presumptively dangerous people.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court decided that the Second Amendment provides law-abiding and
respectful citizens the individual right to own firearms for self-defense in District of
Columbia v. Heller.232 However, presumptively lawful prohibitions can restrict this
right based on previous conduct or occurrences, like prior involuntary commitment.
Some individuals who have previously been involuntarily committed can restore their
Second Amendment right if they live in the right state; others face a lifetime ban.
The Sixth Circuit’s treatment of relief from disability with regard to individuals
previously involuntarily committed provides a fair and reasonable analysis that can
lead to the restoration of Second Amendment rights. 233 It properly considers the
current status of Second Amendment rights and correctly applies intermediate
scrutiny. Its final ruling displays recognition that all individuals could have their
Second Amendment individual right restored and, at minimum, that the existing relief
from disability system calls for a uniform system of law. The ruling recognizes the
unfairness of the current relief from disability programs and that previously
involuntarily committed individuals can recover rather than stigmatizing those with a
history of mental illness. Finally, it balances the compelling government interests like
preventing gun violence and suicide with a path forward for individuals with a
firearms disability. The Sixth Circuit’s ruling provides hope to individuals who have
been previously involuntarily committed that the stigmatization of mental health may
be dissipating and that they can restore their Second Amendment rights to protect
home, hearth, and family like the rest of Americans.

231 Id. at 699.
232 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
233 See generally Tyler, 837 F.3d at 696–99.
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